大西洋月刊专访李光耀:中美关系的未来

Interview: Lee Kuan Yew on the Future of U.S.- China Relations

作者:GRAHAM ALLISON AND ROBERT BLACKWILL 201335the atlantic monthly
Few individuals have had as consequential a role in their nation's history as Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore. During Lee's three-decade long tenure in office, he helped transform Singapore from an impoverished British colony lacking natural resources into one of Asia's wealthiest and most developed countries.


Over the years, Lee has also become one of Asia's most prominent public intellectuals, one whose unique experience and perspective gives him tremendous insight into trends shaping the continent.

In the following conversation, Lee trains his sights to the most prominent geopolitical issue of our time: the rise of China. Rather than attempt to thwart China's emergence as a global superpower, Lee argues, the United States should find ways to work constructively with China in forging a new global order.
This conversation is excerpted from the book Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World comprised of interviews and selections by Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill, with Ali Wyne, and a foreword by Henry A. Kissinger.

How likely is a major confrontation between the United States and China?

Competition between the United States and China is inevitable, but conflict is not. This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world.
There will be a struggle for influence. I think it will be subdued because the Chinese need the United States, need U.S. markets, U.S. technology, need to have students going to the United States to study the ways and means of doing business so they can improve their lot. It will take them 10, 20, 30 years. If you quarrel with the United States and become bitter enemies, all that information and those technological capabilities will be cut off. The struggle between the two countries will be maintained at the level that allows them to still tap the United States.
Unlike U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between the United States and a China that has enthusiastically embraced the market. Sino-American relations are both cooperative and competitive. Competition between them is inevitable, but conflict is not.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive.
A stabilizing factor in their relationship is that each nation requires cooperation from and healthy competition with the other. The danger of a military conflict between China and the United States is low. Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so for the next few decades. They will modernize their forces not to challenge America but to be able, if necessary, to pressure Taiwan by a blockade or otherwise to destabilize the economy. China's military buildup delivers a strong message to the United States that China is serious about Taiwan. However, the Chinese do not want to clash with anyone -- at least not for the next 15 to 20 years. The Chinese are confident that in 30 years their military will essentially match in sophistication the U.S. military. In the long term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight.
China will not let an international court arbitrate territorial disputes in the South China Sea, so the presence of U.S. firepower in the Asia-Pacific will be necessary if the U.N. Law of the Sea is to prevail.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has declared concepts of balance of power obsolete in the 21st century: "Neither [the U.S. nor China] can afford to keep looking at the world through old lenses, whether it's the legacy of imperialism, the Cold War, or balance-of-power politics. Zero sum thinking will lead to negative sum results." What role should the balance of power play in America's strategy for addressing the rise of China?
Prudence dictates that there should be a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. This is reflected in a widely held consensus that the U.S. presence in the region should be sustained. A military presence does not need to be used to be useful. Its presence makes a difference and makes for peace and stability in the region. This stability serves the interests of all, including those of China.


Peace and security both in Europe and in the Pacific still depend on a balance of power. A U.S. military presence in both regions is very necessary. However, unless the U.S. economy becomes more dynamic and less debt laden, this presence will be much reduced by the end of this decade. The longer-term outlook then becomes problematic. Even if U.S. deficits are reduced, industrial productivity improves, and exports increase, the United States nevertheless cannot afford and will not be willing to bear the whole cost of the global security burden. The great danger is that the U.S. economy does not recover quickly enough and trade frictions and Japan bashing increase as America becomes protectionist. The worst case is where trade and economic relations become so bad that mutual security ties are weakened and ruptured. That would be a dreadful and dangerous development.
The world has developed because of the stability America established. If that stability is rocked, we are going to have a different situation.
The size of China will make it impossible for the rest of Asia, including Japan and India, to match it in weight and capacity over the next 20 to 30 years. So we need America to strike a balance. The question is whether the United States can continue its role as a key security and economic player in the Pacific. If she can, East Asia's future is excellent. But there will be problems if the U.S. economy does not recover its competitiveness.
The United States cannot afford to abandon Japan unless it is willing to risk losing its leverage on both China and Japan. Whether or not there is a U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the only stable balance that can be maintained is a triangular one between Japan and the United States on the one side and China on the other. This is inevitable because of China's potential weight, which far exceeds that of the United States and Japan combined.
Why should the United States stay engaged to help East Asia's combined gross national product to exceed that of North America? Why not disengage and abort this process? Because this process is not easily aborted. No alternative balance can be as comfortable as the present one, with the United States as a major player. The geopolitical balance without the United States as a principal force will be very different from that which it now is or can be if the United States remains a central player. My generation of Asians, which experienced the last war, its horrors and miseries, and which remembers the U.S. role in the phoenix-like rise from the ashes of that war to prosperity of Japan, the newly industrializing economies, and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) will feel a keen sense of regret that the world will become so vastly different because the United States becomes a less central player in the new balance.
President Nixon was a pragmatic strategist. He would engage, not contain, China, but he would also quietly set pieces into place for a fallback position should China not play according to the rules as a good global citizen. In this circumstance, in which countries would be forced to take sides, he would arrange to win over Japan, Korea, ASEAN, India, Australia, New Zealand, and Russia to America's side of the chessboard.

Are Chinese leaders serious about displacing the United States as the number one power in Asia and in the world?
Of course. Why not? They have transformed a poor society by an economic miracle to become now the second-largest economy in the world -- on track, as Goldman Sachs has predicted, to become the world's largest economy. They have followed the American lead in putting people in space and shooting down satellites with missiles. Theirs is a culture 4,000 years old with 1.3 billion people, with a huge and very talented pool to draw from. How could they not aspire to be number one in Asia, and in time the world?
Today, China is growing at rates unimaginable 50 years ago, a dramatic transformation no one predicted. The Chinese people have raised their expectations and aspirations. Every Chinese wants a strong and rich China, a nation as prosperous, advanced, and technologically competent as America, Europe, and Japan. This reawakened sense of destiny is an overpowering force.
Unlike other emergent countries, China wants to be China and accepted as such, not as an honorary member of the West. The Chinese will want to share this century as co-equals with the United States.
How should U.S. policies and actions adjust to deal with the rise of China?
For America to be displaced, not in the world, but only in the western Pacific, by an Asian people long despised and dismissed with contempt as decadent, feeble, corrupt, and inept is emotionally very difficult to accept. The sense of cultural supremacy of the Americans will make this adjustment most difficult. Americans believe their ideas are universal -- the supremacy of the individual and free, unfettered expression. But they are not -- never were. In fact, American society was so successful for so long not because of these ideas and principles, but because of a certain geopolitical good fortune: an abundance of resources and immigrant energy, a generous flow of capital and technology from Europe, and two wide oceans that kept conflicts of the world away from American shores.
The United States cannot stop China's rise. It just has to live with a bigger China, which will be completely novel for the United States, as no country has ever been big enough to challenge its position. China will be able to do so in 20 or 30 years. Americans have to eventually share their preeminent position with China.
The size of China's displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance. It is not possible to pretend that this is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of the world.
The U.S. Congress is against any new free-trade agreements (FTAs). If the next Congress continues to oppose FTAs, valuable time will be lost, and it may be too late to try again. Congress must be made to realize how high the stakes are and that the outlook for a balanced and equitable relationship between American and Chinese markets is becoming increasingly difficult. Every year, China attracts more imports and exports from its neighbors than the United States does from the region. Without an FTA, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the ASEAN countries will be integrated into China's economy--an outcome to be avoided.
What policies and actions should the United States avoid in dealing with the rise of China?
Do not treat China as an enemy. Otherwise it will develop a counter-strategy to demolish the United States in the Asia-Pacific. In fact, it is already discussing such a strategy. There will inevitably be a contest between the two countries for supremacy in the western Pacific, but it need not lead to conflict.
The baiting of China by American human rights groups ignores its different culture, values, and history, subordinating the strategic considerations of U.S.-China relations to an American domestic agenda. Such a haphazard approach risks turning China into a long-term adversary of the United States. More understanding of the cultural realities of China can make for a less confrontational relationship.


With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, U.S.-China relations are no longer anchored in a common threat. China has the potential to become a superpower. America's interest is to maintain the status quo, where it is the only superpower. But in 30 years, China's growth could challenge this preeminence. U.S. policy toward China has been driven by extraneous factors, like the saturation media coverage of Tiananmen, the plight of Chinese dissidents fleeing persecution, democracy, human rights, and most-favored-nation status, autonomy for Tibet and the Dalai Lama, and Taiwan's attempts to become an independent member of the United Nations. Issues that challenge China's sovereignty and unity will arouse China's hostility. To emphasize such issues makes sense only if it is U.S. policy to contain China and to slow down or abort its rapid economic growth.
Massive economic reforms have opened up China. If liberalization is the goal of U.S. policy, then more trade and investment are the answers. The State Department draws up its report on China's human rights like a headmaster drawing up a pupil's annual report for the parents. This may make Americans feel good and make Chinese look small, but East Asians are uneasy over its long-term consequences.
It is the United States, more than any other country, that can integrate China into the international community. The difficulty arises from America's expressed desire to make China more democratic. China resents and resists this as interference in its domestic affairs. Outside powers cannot refashion China in their own image. American society is too pluralistic, its interests too varied to have a single or unanimous view of China. Sometimes the language of discourse in America has caused the Chinese to wonder if by engagement the United States does not mean an engagement in combat. China has to be persuaded that the United States does not want to break up China before it is more willing to discuss questions of world security and stability.
Can U.S. policies and actions significantly influence China's trajectory and behavior as it emerges as a great power?
Yes, indeed. If the United States attempts to humiliate China, keep it down, it will assure itself an enemy. If instead it accepts China as a big, powerful, rising state and gives it a seat in the boardroom, China will take that place for the foreseeable future. So if I were an American, I would speak well of China, acknowledge it as a great power, applaud its return to its position of respect and restoration of its glorious past, and propose specific, concrete ways to work together.
Why should the United States take on China now when it knows that doing so will create an unnecessary adversary for a very long time, and one that will grow in strength and will treat it as an enemy? It is not necessary. The United States should say: 'We will eventually be equal, and you may eventually be bigger than me, but we have to work together. Have a seat, and let us discuss the world's problems.'
This is the fundamental choice that the United States has to make: to engage or to isolate China. You cannot have it both ways. You cannot say you will engage China on some issues and isolate her over others. You cannot mix your signals.
America's greatest long-term influence on China comes from playing host to the thousands of students who come from China each year, some of the ablest Chinese scholars and scientists. They will be the most powerful agents for change in China.
As China's development nears the point when it will have enough weight to elbow its way into the region, it will make a fateful decision -- whether to be a hegemon, using its economic and military weight to create a sphere of influence, or to continue as a good international citizen. It is in everyone's interest that before this moment of choice arrives, China should be given every incentive to choose international cooperation, which will absorb its energies constructively for another 50 to 100 years. This means China must have the economic opportunities to do this peacefully, without having to push its way around to get resources like oil, and have access to markets for its goods and services. If such a route is not open to China, the world must live with a pushy China. The United States can through dialogue and cooperation with China chart a course to manage China's transition in the next 20 or 30 years into a big power.


China is an old civilization and will not easily change because of external pressure or sanctions. But changes will come when their leaders, thinkers, and intellectuals become convinced on their own that adopting certain attributes and features of other societies will benefit China.
The best way to quicken the pace and direction of political change in China is to increase its trade and investment links with the world. Then its prosperity will depend increasingly on the compatibility of its economic system with those of the major trading nations. And wide-ranging contacts will influence and modify its cultural values and moral standards.
Integrating China into the global system will build up strong vested interests in China to play by international rules. It will increase China's interdependence for trade, services, investments, technology, and information. These interdependent links could increase to a point where to break them in a unilateral breach of international obligations would carry unbearable costs.
Peace and security in the Asia-Pacific will turn on whether China emerges as a xenophobic, chauvinistic force, bitter and hostile to the West because it tried to slow down or abort its development, or whether it is educated and involved in the ways of the world -- more cosmopolitan, more internationalized and outward looking.
How should Chinese policies and actions adjust to establish a sustained cooperative relationship with the United States?
From 1945 to 1991, China was engaged in a series of wars that nearly broke them. This generation has been through hell: the Great Leap Forward, hunger, starvation, near collision with the Russians -- the Cultural Revolution gone mad. I have no doubt that this generation wants a peaceful rise. But this generation's grandchildren? They think that they have already arrived, and if they begin to flex their muscles, we will have a very different China. Grandchildren never listen to grandfathers. The other problem is a more crucial one: if you start off with the belief that the world has been unkind to you, the world has exploited you, the imperialists have devastated you, looted Beijing, done all this to you -- this is not good. If I were America, Europe, or Japan, I would spend time to make sure that the mindset of the younger generation is not one of hostility, but one of acceptance and an understanding that you are now a stakeholder, which was Bob Zoellick's very apt description of their role. Make them feel that they are stakeholders, and if this earth goes warm, they will be in as much trouble as anyone else.
It is vital that the younger generation of Chinese, who have only lived during a period of peace and growth in China and have no experience of China's tumultuous past, are made aware of the mistakes China made as a result of hubris and excesses in ideology. They have to be imbued with the right values and attitudes to meet the future with humility and responsibility. The authors of China's doctrine of peaceful emergence are acutely conscious that as China resumes its recovery, it has the responsibility and self-interest to assure its neighbors, and the world at large, that its emergence is benign, not a threat but a plus for the world, that it will try to avoid disruption and conflict. China is aware of the problems its rapid growth will present to the rest of the world and wishes to work together with the international community to minimize the disturbance. It is to the good of China to study how to mitigate the adverse impacts of its growth.
The ways in which Chinese superiority will be expressed will undoubtedly be quite different than in the earlier era. Take the current case of East Asia, where they have, obviously, established a dominant economic position in relations with their neighbors, and used that position including access to a market of 1.3 billion people and significant investments in other countries to their advantage. If states or enterprises do not accept China's position and pay appropriate deference, they are faced with the threat of being shut out of a rapidly growing market with 1.3 billion people.



李光耀谈中美关系的未来
作者:哈雷厄姆·埃利森 罗伯特·布莱克威尔/文 曹光伍/译  2013321外交观察网
采访:哈雷厄姆·埃利森、罗伯特·布莱克威尔
    2013年3月5日 《大西洋月刊》
  在这个书摘里面,亚洲一位最伟大的政治家说,中美两国之间的竞争是避免不了的,但冲突并非不可避免的。
  李光耀是新加坡开国总理。很少有人像他一样对该国的历史产生巨大影响。在李光耀30年的执政生涯中,他帮助新加坡从一个穷困的、缺少自然资源的英国殖民地转变成亚洲一个最富裕的、最发达的国家。
  多年以来,李光耀也是亚洲最杰出的公共知识分子。他拥有非同寻常的经验和视角,这使得他能够深入洞察塑造这块大陆的趋势。在接下来的访谈中,李光耀把目光对准我们这个时代最引人注目的地缘政治问题:中国的崛起。李光耀认为,美国不要试图阻挠中国崛起成为全球超级大国,美国应找到与中国携手建设性地打造新的全球秩序的方法。
  本访谈摘自《李光耀:大师洞察中国、美国和世界》一书。该书内容由格雷厄姆·埃利森、罗伯特·布莱克威尔和阿里·维内所进行的采访和精选构成。基辛格为本书撰写了前言。
  问:中美之间发生正面对峙的可能性有多大?
  
  中美两国无法避免竞争,但可以避免冲突。现在不是冷战时期,当时前苏联是为了全球霸权才与美国争斗,但如今中国纯粹是为了自己的国家利益而行事,对改变世界没什么兴趣。
  双方将竞争影响力。不过,我认为这种竞争的局势会逐渐缓解,因为中国需要美国,需要美国的市场和技术,需要派学生去美国学习如何经商以便加以多多改善。这将花费10年或20年乃至30年的时间。如果中国和美国吵架,彼此变成死对头,那么中国所有的信息和技术发展能力将被切断。因此,中美两国之间的竞争将维持在一个能使中国继续利用美国资源的水平上。
  与冷战时期美苏关系不同的是,一个热情拥抱市场的中国与美国之间不存在不可调和的意识形态冲突。中美关系既是竞争的又是合作的关系。中美两国无法避免竞争,但可以避免冲突。
  在前苏联解体以后,纵使中国和美国不是视对方为敌手的话,至少也是视对方为竞争对手。但厄运并没降临。当两国无法合作的时候,最好的结果就是双方要更新认识,认识到两国能共存,而且太平洋地区的所有国家都能发展和兴旺。
  中美两国关系稳定不变的是,双方都需要合作和良性竞争。中美两国爆发军事冲突的可能性不大。如今中国的领导人其实清楚美国压倒性的军事优势,而且这个优势还要持续几十年。中国将推动军事现代化,不是为了挑战美国,而是在必要时通过军事封锁或其他方式向台湾施压,动摇台湾的经济。中国的军备建设传递给美国一个强大的信息,那就是中国不会放弃台湾。然而中国人不想和任何人发生冲突--至少是在今后的15~20年内。中国人相信自己30年后的军事力量能与美国抗衡。从长远来说,两国都不认为自己在这场斗争中会处于不利地位。
  中国不会让国际法庭仲裁南中国海领土争议,因此如果联合国的《海洋法公约》要想得到遵守的话,美国就有必要在亚太地区保持军事力量。
  问:美国前国务卿希拉里曾宣布,势力均衡的概念在21世纪已经过时。她说:“中美两国都不能用旧眼光看待当今世界,无论是帝国主义与冷战的遗留还是势力均衡政治。一胜一负的零和博弈思维会导致完全的负面结果。”在美国针对中国崛起的战略里,“势力均衡”应该扮演一个怎样的角色呢?
  审慎的思维是,亚太地区应保持力量均衡。这反映了一个广泛的共识,即美国应保持在这一地区的存在。军事存在不一定非要用于有用的军事目的。军事存在会产生一定影响并且有助于该地区和平和稳定。这种稳定是为包括中国在内的所有各方利益服务的。
  欧洲和太平洋地区的和平和安全依旧依靠势力均衡。美国军队在这两个地区的存在是很有必要的。然而,除非美国的经济变得更有活力并且负债更少,否则存在的力量在这个十年期的末尾将被大大削减。那么对更长远的预期就更加具有不确定性的。即使美国财政赤字减少了,工业生产率提高了,出口增长了,美国仍承担不了也不愿意承担全球安全方面的全部费用。最大的威胁来自美国经济没有快速复苏,以及随着美国成为保护主义者,贸易摩擦与打压日本增多。最糟糕的情况是,贸易和经济关系变得如此恶劣,导致共同安全纽带变弱并断裂。这会是可怕的、危险的发展。
  世界因美国建立的稳定环境才得以发展,一旦这样的稳定动摇,我们势必会面临极其困难的处境。
  中国的强大将令包括日本和印度在内的亚洲其他地区在未来的20年到30年内无法在经济力量和能力上匹敌中国。因此我们需要美国去建立一种平衡。问题是,美国是否能继续扮演其在太平洋地区的安全和经济方面的重要角色。如果美国能做到的话,那么东亚地区的未来会大有希望。但如果美国无法恢复其经济的竞争力,那么将会产生问题。
  美国无法放弃日本,除非日本愿意冒中日之间失衡的风险。不管有没有《美日安保条约》,能够保持的唯一平衡就是中国为一方、日本与美国为一方之间的三角关系。由于中国拥有远超美日共有的潜在的力量,这种三角关系是不可避免的。
  为何美国还要帮助东亚国家,使它们合计的国民总产值超过北美呢?为何不放手不管并终止这方面的进程呢?因为终止这个进程并不容易。不可能有一个如现在这样令人舒服的、美国在其中扮演主角的平衡了。没有美国作为主要力量的地缘政治平衡将与美国仍起主导作用的地缘政治现状或未来大不一样。经历了上一场世界大战还有战争的恐怖和悲惨;还记得美国帮助日本、新兴的走向工业化的国家与东盟(东南亚国家联盟)从战争的废墟走向繁荣中所扮演的角色,如果美国在新的平衡中不再是核心角色,我们这一代亚洲人将深深地感叹,世界会变得大不一样。
  尼克松总统是一位务实的战略家。他与中国交往,不遏制中国,但如果中国作为全球一份子不按规则行事的话,他也会悄悄地设定自己的退路。在这种情况下,国家就要选择立场,而尼克松会设法让日本、韩国、东盟、印度、澳大利亚、新西兰和俄罗斯站到美国身边。
  问:中国领导人真的想要取代美国成为亚洲第一乃至世界第一吗?
  当然,为什么不呢?中国已经创造了一个经济奇迹,从一个贫穷的国家转变成当今世界第二大的经济体--按照高盛公司的预测,中国正在成为全世界最大的经济体。他们紧随美国,能把人送上太空,能用导弹打下卫星。中国拥有4000年的文化、13亿人口、可以利用的优秀人才储备。中国怎不渴望成为亚洲第一乃至世界第一呢?
  如今中国正以50年前难以想象到的速度向前发展,没人能预测到这个急剧的转变。中国人的期望和抱负更大了。中国人都渴望中国如美国、欧洲和日本一样富强、繁荣、发达和具有技术竞争力。这种复苏的使命感是压倒一切的力量。
  但和其他新兴国家不同,中国只想做中国并被真正接受,中国不想成为西方的一名荣誉会员。中国希望在21世纪能与美国平起平坐。
  问:美国要怎样调整政策和行动来应对中国的崛起呢?
  中国长期被瞧不起和排斥,被认为是颓废、虚弱、腐败和无能的国家;若美国在西太平洋地区(不是全世界)的地位被中国取代,西方国家在情绪上极难接受。美国的“文化霸权”意识将使得这种情绪调整变得非常困难。美国人相信他们的思想具有普遍性--个人言论自由的至高无上性。但实际上美国人思想并不是这样--从来不是。美国之所以长期取得成功,不是因为这些思想与原则,而是因为特殊的地缘政治所带来的财富:丰富的资源和大量的移民,来自欧洲的大量资本和技术,以及让美国与世界上其他地方的冲突分隔开来的两大海洋。
  美国阻止不了中国的崛起。如何与更加强大的中国和平共处,这对于美国来说将会是个全新的挑战,因为世界上还没有哪个国家强大到能够挑战美国的地位。而中国在20年或30年后能够做到这点。最终,美国将不得不与中国分享主导地位。
  中国打破世界力量的平衡的威力是如此之大,因此这个世界必须要找到新的平衡。说有另外一个重大的参与者不可能是说假话。中国是世界历史上最大的参与者。
  美国国会反对签署新的自由贸易协定(FTA)。如果下一届国会依然如此,会浪费许多宝贵时间,而且可能因拖延日久再尝试也不可能了。必须要让国会认识到代价有多大,认识到要在中美两国的市场上建立一种平衡且平等的关系会变得越来越困难。中国每年与其邻国间的进出口额比美国与中国的邻国间的进出口额要大。如果美国不签署自由贸易协定(FTA),韩国、日本、台湾和东盟国家都将被融入中国的经济中--这是一个美国要避免的结果。
  问:在应对中国的崛起方面,美国应避免什么样的政策和行为?
  不要把中国视作敌人。否则中国会采取反制措施打击美国在亚太地区的存在。实际上,中国已经在讨论这类措施了。两国在西太平洋地区的主导权之争将是无法避免的,但不必非要造成冲突。
  招惹中国的美国人权组织没有看到中国不同的文化、价值和历史,把对中美关系的战略思考放在美国国内的议事日程之后。这样的随意之举会冒着把中国推向美国的对立面的风险。更多地理解中国的文化现实有助于建立一种没有什么对峙的关系。
  随着前苏联的解体,中美关系不再基于应对共同威胁。中国有潜力成为一个超级大国。美国的利益所在是维护其作为当今唯一一个超级大国的现状。但是30年后,中国的壮大将挑战美国的主导地位。美国对华政策常受到外界因素的驱动,比如媒体对“天安门事件”的大幅报道、中国异见者逃亡的困境、民主、人权、最惠国待遇、西藏自治与达赖喇嘛以及台湾试图成为联合国独立会员国。凡是挑战中国主权和统一的行为都会引起中国的反对。当美国实行遏制中国、阻挠或中断其经济快速发展的政策时,美国就会用以上这些问题做由头。
  重大的经济改革让中国敞开大门。如果自由化是美国政策的目标,那么更多的贸易和投资就是答案。美国国务院起草关于中国人权状况的报告就像是中小学校长给学生家长开列子女的学年成绩单。这或许让美国感觉良好,让中国人丢脸,但东亚国家对美国这种做法的长期后果心神不宁。
  现在只有美国能够把中国纳入国际社会中去。但当美国表示出要让中国变得更加民主时,问题就产生了。中国憎恨和抵制这种干涉本国内政的行为。外部力量不能把自己的模式强加于中国。美国社会太多元,与中国的利益关系也十分复杂,因此无法用一种或普遍一致的观点来看待中国。有时美国人的话语让中国人费解,是不是中国参与了,美国就不会搅起争斗了。美国要让中国相信,在中国更愿意讨论世界安全和稳定问题之前,美国不想搞垮中国。
  问:随着中国崛起为一个强国,美国的政策与行动能对中国未来的发展轨迹和行为产生重大影响吗?
  能的,的确是这样。如果美国试图羞辱中国,打压中国,美国就是在把自己变成中国的敌人。如果美国接受中国为正在崛起的强大的大国,给中国在会议室中准备一个位置,中国在可预测的未来就会接过那个位子。因此我若是美国人,我会说中国的好话,承认它是一个强国,为它重获尊敬和重现昔日的辉煌而鼓掌,并提出能携手努力的具体办法。
  既然美国知道接纳中国就是会产生远期的一个不必要的对手,一个力量增长并视美国为敌人的国家,为何美国现在要接纳中国呢? 没有必要这样想。美国应该说:“我们最终会平起平坐,而且最终你可能比我强大,但我们要携手努力。坐下来,让我们讨论世界问题吧。”
  这是美国要作出的根本选择:是与中国交往还是孤立中国。你不能二者兼得。你不能说你一边让中国参与一些事情,一边又不让它参与一些事情。你不能把不同的信号意图混为一谈。
  美国每年要接待数千名来自中国的学生,其中有一些是中国最有才华的学者和科学家。他们将是改变中国最强大的力量。美国正是通过这些中国留学生对中国施加最大的长期影响。
  当中国发展到它有足够的力量介入地区事务的时候,它将作出重大决定--是做一个利用其经济和军事力量打造势力范围的霸权国,还是继续做一个国际良民。在中国的抉择时候来临之前,全力推动中国选择国际合作符合每个人的利益,这将让中国获得又一个长达50~100年的时间去建设性地凝聚各方力量。这意味着中国必须拥有和平发展的经济机会,不必为获得像石油这样的资源和为其商品和服务获得市场准入而到处艰苦打拼。如果这样的道路不向中国开放,世界就要和一个强硬的中国共处。通过与中国的对话与合作,美国能够确定前进路线,应对中国在未来20年或30年后向一个大国的转变。
  中国是一个文明古国,外界的压力与制裁无法轻易改变这个国家。但当中国的领导人、思想家和知识分子自信汲取他国的优点和长处能给中国带来好处时,改变就会来临。
  加强中国与世界其他国家的贸易与投资联系是加快中国政治改革的步伐和方向的最好方法。中国的繁荣昌盛将日益取决于其经济制度与其他主要贸易国的经济制度的兼容性。与外界更加广泛的联系也将影响和改变中国的文化价值与道德标准。
  把中国融入全球体系将给中国带来巨大的既得利益,促使中国按国际规则行事。这将增加中国在贸易、服务、投资、技术和信息方面与世界的相互依赖性。当这些相互依赖的关系发展一定程度时,只要有一方违反国际义务从而打破这种关系,就会付出无法承受的代价。
  不论中国崛起为一个排外的、盲目爱国的国家或因西方试图阻挠或中断其发展而对西方怀恨或敌视,还是中国学会并走国际路线,亚太地区的和平与安全都将更具世界性、更加国际化和更多外向特征。
  问:中国应如何调整政策与行动,来与美国建立一种可持续的合作关系呢?
  从1945年到1991年,中国经历了一系列的动乱,几乎压垮了这个国家。一代人仿佛经历了一场地狱之旅:大跃进、饥饿、饥荒、与前苏联的冲突、及至丧失理智的“文革”。我毫不怀疑现在这一代中国人渴望和平崛起。但是我们的下下一代呢?孙子们总是不愿意听从爷爷们的话。另外一个问题更至关重要:如果你一开始就深信这个世界对你不好,剥削你;帝国主义者蹂躏你,洗劫北京,尽对你干些坏事--这不是好事情。如果我是美国、欧洲或日本,我会花时间做工作,确保年轻一代人的思想不是敌视,而是理解和接受你为利益攸关方,这也是佐利克对他们的角色作出的非常恰当的描述。要让他们感到他们是利益攸关方,要让他们明白,如果地球气候变暖了,大家都一样有麻烦。
  中国的年轻一代生活在和平和发展时期,没有经历动荡的过去,因此非常有必要使他们明白中国因自大和过激的思想所犯下的错误。要让他们充满正确的价值观和态度,带着谦卑和责任感迎接挑战。中国的和平崛起论者敏锐地意识到,随着中国步入康庄大道,它有责任并从自身利益出发使邻国乃至世界相信,它的崛起根不是什么威胁,而是有益的,是世界的正能量,而且它会力避妨碍和冲突。中国意识到它的快速发展将给世界其他地区带来问题,希望与国际社会一道携手努力把妨碍减少到最低程度。中国研究如何减少其发展的不利影响对自身也是有好处的。
  毫无疑问,中国这次展现优势的方式将与以前的时代大不一样。以当前的东亚为例,中国显然在与邻国的关系中建立了支配地位,并利用此地位,兼之以13亿人口的市场与对其他国家的重大投资,去做对自己有利的事情。如果各国或企业不接受中国的地位并适当地顺势而为,就会面临着被拥有13亿人口的快速发展的中国市场抛弃的风险。




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